ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
The paper starts with a brief background of the Swedish regulatory system and the process that led up to the situation today. The fundamentals in a regulatory model, according to Vattenfall Eldistribution, are presented followed by a description of the new Swedish ex-ante model and the objections that the DSO's emphasised in their appeal to the Swedish Administrative Court. The Regulator has altered its position on several of the issues but there is still a lot to be done to reach a robust, long-term, predictable, stable and objective solution for the industry.
BACKGROUND
The Swedish parliament decided in 2009 that the Regulator should develop a new ex-ante regulatory model, aligned with the EU directive. The aim was to replace the old Network Performance Assessment Model, an ex-post regulatory model, in 2012 with a new ex-ante model. The decision to develop a new ex-ante model was welcomed by the industry as a whole. The ex-post regulatory model, the Network Performance Assessment Model, was seen as to complex and unpredictable. The preparatory work leading up to a new ex-ante model Regulator, the industry, end customers and academics. The goal was to create a model that would give a robust, longterm, predictable, stable and objective regulatory framework that incentivizes and facilitates the energy transition within electricity distribution networks, including adequate incentives for investments. This type of model was considered especially important at a time when the industry was, and still is, in a state of significant change. The industry thought that there was a good collaboration between the different parties and was quite assured that the outcome would be a good balanced model that would benefit the customers, the industry and the society as a whole. The Reg new ex-ante revenue frames on October 31, 2011. Instead of announcing the new ex-ante revenue frames for the period 2012 to 2015 as pre stated the Regulator announced a transitional period up to 2027. The decision confused the whole industry. In principal all approved according to the original new ex-ante model by the Regulator but after the transition period of 16 years. The industry had been able to apply for a total sum of 183 BSEK and got 148 BSEK for the period 2012-2015. The Regulator thereby reduced the industries revenue frame with 35 BSEK in the transition period compared to the original developed ex-ante model. The Regulator argued that there was a need for the transition period in order to gradually adjust to the new regulation. This is particularly strange in the context of an already decided adjustment period 2008-2011 between the old ex-post model and the new ex-ante regulation by the Regulator. The Regulator justified this by referring to the societal interest of low and stable network tariffs. More than 50 percent o including the three major DSO's -E.ON, Fortum and Vattenfall reacted by appealing the decision. According to these DSO's the new transition period was, besides being in violation of the Swedish Electricity Act and was essentially incorrect on the following points; investments, up-stream network costs, indexation and the historical period. Besides these points, the Regulator had diminished the impact of the important quality regulation. for a model that could
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPALS IN A REGULATORY MODEL ACCORDING TO VATTENFALL ELDISTRIBUTION
Vattenfall recognizes the importance of a strong regulation as the foundation in an industry with a natural monopoly. Without a strong regulation the industry and its partisans will have a hard time to build up consumer trust in society. At the end the DSO's and the Regulator are dependent on some sort of public recognition and trust regarding price level and distribution quality. Vattenfall Eldistribution believes that an ideal regulatory model for electricity distribution should be robust, long-term, predictable, stable and objective. The model should be balanced to the extent that the market situation objectively imitates a free market situation. As a crucial part of the societal infrastructure DSO's needs the opportunity to deliver a reasonable yield and at the same time stimulate an energy efficient usage in society. This is not an easy balance when profits are mostly made by the consumption of energy. Nine principles to be considered in establishing a regulatory model are ummarized below. Vattenfall Eldis s these principles must be included and carefully balanced to achieve an ideal regulatory model;
 Provide incentives to streamline and rationalize the individual DSO. Due to the market situation with a natural monopoly there is no natural "force" that provides incentives to stre organizations. Hence such incentives must be intertwined in the regulatory model.  Provide incentives for structural rationalization. A good functional model should not just have incentives that stimulate rationalization of individual organizations. A good functi should also include incentives for structural rationalization of the whole industry. Monopoly can sometimes work as a "safe haven" for ill managed organizations. An ideal regulatory model should provide incentives that counteract such behaviour and stimulates a rationalization of the whole market structure. Not just when it comes to ill managed organizatio comes to rationalization of the borders between the different concession areas.  Provide incentives for investment, R&D and technical development. This is a central point today due to the role the electricity network can and will have in the overall societal energy conversion with the increasing demands on smart grid, smart metering, etc. There are clear risks that the DSO's won't be able to take their central role in the future energy landscape to meet the customers long-term needs of quality and oth electricity related services etc. without sufficient incentives, due to the required short timespan. 
THE NEW EX-ANTE REGULATORY MODEL IN SWEDEN
The original ex-ante regulatory model covered most of the above principles. It had e.g. reasonable incentives for investments, structural rationalizations, quality and a balanced obstruction function to hinder monopoly profits. It wasn't perfect but it was a good base have become a good functional model for all stakeholders Stockholm, 10-13 June 2013
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Paper No 1382 to justify a value tention structure and promote re-investments a quality regulation was set up, see figure 1. [2] removed due to the alteration of the several fundamental issues in the transition eriod. The following fundamental issues were questioned y conversion, an industry ded to carry some of the non-influential costs that the TSO put on the the positive.
lved after the Regulators response to the Administrative this crucial element. There are not ts our view that a regulatory model should be robust. The n in society. The following only minor adjustments. In short, the newly developed ex-ante model consists of three parts; influential costs with efficiency requirements, non-influential costs and the regulatory capital base (RAB). The capital base was unlike other electricity distribution regulatory models structured around value retention with real annuity. This means that re-investments do not influence the capital base. In order re The setback came when the Swedish Regulator announced the alterations to the original ex-ante model with the 16-year transition period. The alteration implies that at least three of the most important cornerstones in a regulatory model were prerequisites in the regulation, being robust, long-term and predictable. The DSO's appealed the Regulator's decision in the Swedish Administrative Court on the grounds that the decision to impose a transition period among other things was in violation to the Swedish Electricity Act. The DSO's also questioned p by the DSO's;  New investments; the DSO's would not get full return on their capital base when investing. New investments would only give one-third return on the capital base, which meant that the Regulator had reduced the incentives for new investments. This in an industry that plays an essential role in the future societal energ in great need of investment to be able to take on that responsibility.  The cost of capital (WACC); the DSO:s argue that the cost of capital is too low. Determining the cost of capital is by no means an exact science. It is impossible to set an exact value. Various studies give different outcomes. Other similar industries in Sweden such as district heating, the regulated gas industry and the fixed fibre telecommunication network industry have a higher cost of capital than the 5,2% imposed on the electricity distribution industry. It can be argued that there is a higher risk in electricity distribution than the above named industries. Historically the cost of capital for DSO's has been about 6,5 % in Sweden. The risk level today could hardly be viewed as lower with the on-going energy conversio Besides the fundamental issues in the appeal there is one more crucial issue missing in the proposed transition period in order to build the basis for a robust, long-term, predictable, stable and objective regulatory model. That is a strong quality regulation. This is especial the capital base, as in Sweden, is determined by a value retention structure on the real annuity. A quality regulation was included in the original ex-ante model [2] . The strength of the quality regulation could already be questioned in the original developed model and was diminished to an insignificant aspect in the decide transition period. The quality aspect was downsized to give one third of the impact of the original developed model. Quality in the sense of secure supply is a central part of the core product/offering in the electricity distribution industry. Societal acceptance of the industry could be jeopardized if questions regarding quality aris importance that a long-term sustainable model has a strong quality regulation attached to it. It can be furth st cornerstones;
 There should be a quality aspect that influences the given revenue frame for each DSO.  The revenue frame should cover reasonable costs to run the network business during a supervi that are needed in the network business.
[1] D introduced transit
DISCUSSION
Most of the concerned stakeholders would most likely agree on the fundamental principles presented in this paper. None of the principles should be seen as controversial. They could even be viewed as quite basic and rudimentary principles for an informed person. All stakeholders would most likely also agree that a regulatory model should be robust, long-term, predictable, stable and objective. The difficulty with most regulations is the objective aspect of the regulation. All stakeholders regardless of whether they are politicians, NGOs, DSOs, the public etc. will always try to influence the regulation and its status in society. The Regulator´s most important role is to be the independent organisation that is objective and is able to stand up against all kind sensible solution for the industry, customers and society as a whole. 
